This paper measures and investigates the reasons for the gap in secondary education progression between Muslims and non-Muslims. The analysis is done using a panel dataset from Indonesia that follows 3 rd to 6 th grade students over 14 years, until the sample is well into adulthood. Muslim males face a lower chance of enrolling in college compared to non-Muslim males, while among females the gap is largest at senior secondary enrolment. Equalising two sets of covariates, scholastic ability and parental education, removes most of the gap. Based on these results, this paper concludes by providing some policy recommendations.
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I. Introduction
About one-fifth of the world population are Muslims, making Islam the second largest religion in the world (Barrett, Kurian, and Johnson, 2001) . In countries where they are the minority, Muslims are less educated and poorer (e.g. Glewwe and Jacoby, 1994; Borooah and Iyer, 2005) . Cross-country evidence, meanwhile, shows that the share of Muslim population is negatively correlated with democracy (Barro, 1999; Clague, Gleason, and Knack, 2001) , social cohesion (Easterly, Ritzen, and Woolcock, 2006) and female-male literacy ratio (Pryor, 2007) .
With regards to economic prosperity, the share of Muslims in a population has a negative effect on economic growth (e.g. McCleary and Barro, 2004) . Hillman (2007) finds that Muslim societies without any oil reserves have lower incomes than their comparable non-Muslim neighbours, and Kuran (2004) states that commercial practices in Middle Eastern countries have remained the same for eight centuries.
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In a series of papers, Kuran (2003 Kuran ( , 2004 argues that Islamic laws are the main reason for the underdevelopment of Middle Eastern countries. Hillman (2007) , meanwhile, asserts that Islam's strict adherence to the supreme value system, where the main objective of Islam is to increase its domain, allows the leaders in Muslim majority countries to relegate economic and human development behind the supreme objective to conquest more land or reconquest lost ones. Finally, Platteau (2008) states that the Islamic frame of reference provides political rulers with an option to default when they face pressure to upgrade their country's institutions and to accuse their opponents of un-Islamic behaviour. In summary, the above studies attribute the adverse relationship between Islam and indicators of progress, such as democracy, economic prosperity, and human development to be mainly the result of Islamic teaching.
Relative to the amount of research done to investigate the reasons behind economic and democratic outcomes of Muslims, there is relatively less research done on understanding the reasons why Muslims have lower educational outcomes. 2 Looking at cross-country data shown in Figure 1 , it is indeed the case that the share of Muslims in a population is negatively correlated with education outcomes.
1 In contrast, Noland (2005) and Pryor (2007) do not find any strong relationship between share of Muslim population and economic indicators. In the former study, some of the coefficients are positive although only one is statistically significant. Meanwhile, the coefficients in the latter study are negative. Young (2009) finds that the results of McCleary and Barro (2004) are not robust to different specifications and Sala-iMartin, Doppelhofer, and Miller (2004) find a positive effect of Islam on economic growth. 2 Glewwe and Jacoby (1994) use Ghanaian data and find that Muslims continue to have a significantly lower education level even after controlling for other covariates, including inherent ability and parental education. Meanwhile, Borooah and Iyer (2005) uncover a substantial gap in school enrolment rates between Hindu and Muslim children in India. In addition, they find that the gap between Hindus and Muslims is greater than the observed differences in economic positions between the two groups. Pryor (2007) , meanwhile, uses crosscountry data and finds lower female-male literacy ratio in countries with higher share of Muslim population. He does not attempt to investigate the causes.
The top left panel in Figure 1 shows that a 10% increase in the share of Muslim population is associated with 0.3 years of lower education attainment among adults. While the correlation becomes smaller after I control for GDP and democracy, shown in Table 1 , it remains statistically significant. Meanwhile, the middle left panel in Figure 1 shows that a similar increase in the share of Muslim population is associated with a 2.1% lower secondary enrolment rate. Finally, the bottom left panel shows that performance at PISA is also negatively associated with the share of Muslim population. 469 Notes: ** 5% significance, *** 1% significance; standard errors in parentheses;all estimations have homoskedastic residuals; All data is for 2000; the share of Muslim population in each country is copied from Barrett, Kurian, and Johnson (2001) in percent; GDP per capita is in 2000 US$; Polity 2 Index range from -10 (Institutional Autocracy) to +10 (Institutional Democracy); gender gap is the ratio of male to female attainment.
The right-hand graphs in Figure 1 examine on the correlations between the share of Muslim on gender gap, measured by male to female ratio in the three outcomes. The top graph shows that on average, adult men have one-fifth higher education attainment than adult women. At the mean of female education attainment, this is equivalent to 1.2 years. More importantly, the estimation results show that the gap is significantly wider in countries with higher share of Muslim population. Meanwhile, the middle panel shows that the pattern is similar with regards to secondary net enrolment rate. Looking at the bottom graph, however, the proportion of females scoring in PISA's highest reading proficiency bracket is higher than males and that females perform even better in countries with a higher share of Muslim population. Therefore, while in the top and middle graphs there is some indication that females have increasingly lower education attainment as the share of Muslim population increases, the performance of females in these countries are better than in countries with lower share of Muslim population.
In summary, Figure 1 and Table 1 show that the share of Muslim population in a country has a negative correlation with education outcomes. Moreover, it is also positively correlated with larger male/female ratio in two out of the three outcomes. Given the relatively important role of education on economic prosperity and democracy, it is important to unearth the reasons behind it and examine whether there are policies that could be undertaken to address it.
In this paper, I investigate the issue of religion gap in education outcomes between Muslim and non-Muslim children using Indonesian data. Despite being a secular country, Indonesia is the largest Muslim majority country in the world, home to about 180 million Muslims. An advantage of data from Indonesia is that the religion cuts across ethnic lines. Hence, any education gap that I unearth may not be caused ethnic-specific differences. Moreover, most Indonesians do not change their religious affiliation and there is virtually no family of mixed religions. This fact ensures that religion is very likely to be exogenous in Indonesia.
The key reason for choosing Indonesia, in addition to the fact that it has a large enough Muslim respondents in any household survey, is that it has a 14-year longitudinal household survey dataset. The main barrier to the lack of comprehensive studies on this issue thus far, especially in developing countries, is the lack of a suitable dataset.
3 Admittedly, it is not the norm in the literature to focus on the majority group. However, the evidence above suggests that one should focus on Muslims as opposed to non-Muslims as they are the disadvantaged group. In any case, since the next largest religious group in Indonesia is Christian, one could interpret the negative of the results as a Christian advantage. 3 To the best of my knowledge, the only study in developing countries that uses long-spanning panel dataset thus far is Lillard and Willis (1994) . 4 While Indonesia is home to many religions, the fact that two religions, Islam and Christianity, are followed by 95% of the population prevents me from looking at how Islam compares to each religion. Hence, in the Specifically, I investigate the extent of Muslim and non-Muslim gap in education progression through secondary school in Indonesia and examine whether there are policies that could be undertaken to address it. The choice to focus on the secondary level is due to the fact that primary education attainment is practically universal in Indonesia. In contrast, the net secondary school enrolment rate has been hovering around 60% at the junior secondary level and 40% at the senior secondary level between 2000 (World Bank, 2007 .
Separating the analysis by sex, I find that both among male and female Muslims have lower progression rates relative to their respective non-Muslim counterparts. Among males, there is a substantial and statistically significant gap with regards to secondary school and post-secondary school enrolment. Among females, Muslims have a lower chance of enrolling in senior secondary school. Regarding the gap at senior secondary enrolment, I find that equalising scholastic ability and parental education completely removes the gap. Hence, the reason why Muslims are left behind at this education stage is due to these two characteristics. The Muslim gap among males at post-secondary enrolment, meanwhile, is most likely to be caused by differences in the labour market returns to tertiary education between Muslims and non-Muslims.
I organise the rest of this paper as follows. The next section explores the main features of the Indonesian primary and secondary education system. Section III discusses the conceptual framework in understanding religion gap in education. Section IV describes the dataset. Section V analyses the observed gap in school progression rates. Sections VI and VII contain the main estimation results. Section VIII presents robustness checks. Sections IX and X provide some extensions. Section XI concludes and discusses the policy recommendations.
II. The Indonesian Primary and Secondary School System
The primary school system in Indonesia covers the first to sixth grades, at the end of which children must pass a national examination in order to qualify to the secondary level. Primary education attainment is almost universal in Indonesia, where 99.6% of primary school-age children are enrolled in or have graduated from primary school across the country by 1988 (Government of Indonesia, 1998). Meanwhile, the secondary school system is divided into two major parts. The junior secondary system covers the seventh to ninth grades, and the senior secondary system is from tenth to twelfth grades. Similar to primary schools, students must sit in a national examination at the end of the junior and senior secondary levels.
main analysis I categorise Christianity and all the other religions into "non-Muslim", and in the robustness checks section I focus on the Muslim-Christian education gap.
There are basically two large education systems operating in Indonesia, each having its own curriculum and administration. The first one is a secular system, while the second is an Islamic system (madrasah). The former is a decentralised system, where the schools are under the administration of district governments. The responsibility of the central government's Ministry of National Education is to design the core curriculum and administer the national examination at the end of each level. The latter, meanwhile, is centralised under the Ministry of Religious Affairs. The main difference between the two systems is on the curriculum. In the secular system, religion is one of among many taught subjects. In the madrasah, meanwhile, Islam is the foundation of the curriculum.
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School participation at the primary and secondary levels has been steady for the past decade. 
III. Conceptual Framework on Education Gaps
I draw the concepts pertaining to the relationship between group differences in education progression mainly from the works of Chiswick (1988) , Borjas (1992) , and Gang and Zimmermann (2000) . There are basically two contrasting streams of thought with regards to this issue. The first states that the differences are permanent because it is driven by group-specific factors. The second stream, meanwhile, states that the differences are caused by a group having less resources than the other, and that once the gap in resources are equalised, there should be no education gap between the groups. I discuss these two views in greater detail below.
Starting from the first stream, Chiswick (1988) argues that demand differences are basically caused by between-group differences in the price of quantity of children relative to the price of quality of children. The group where the quantity of children is cheaper compared the quality of children would have more children of lower quality. As a consequence, this group would have more children than the other group, but each child would have a lower education level. In their theoretical work, De Tray (1973) and Becker and Lewis (1973) state that one way to test this is through the mother's education. Other testable hypotheses discussed by Chiswick (1988) include group differences in the number of siblings and female labour supply.
The second group-specific factor is related to ethnic capital. Borjas (1992) argues that ethnicity acts as an externality in the human capital accumulation process. He finds that ethnic capital-the average education level of an ethnic group-plays a very important role in a child's education attainment; the effect is as large as the effect of the education level of the child's father.
Hence, he argues that a child from an ethnic group with low ethnic capital may have a harder time progressing beyond the education level of his or her predecessors. In their study on the children of immigrants in Germany, however, Gang and Zimmermann (2000) find that the education outcome of second-generation immigrants closely mirrors that of the Germans rather than their parents.
The third factor is possibly the most important one: group-specific practice or ideology, which influnces a group's optimal investment in education. Chiswick (1988) states that the Jew experience in diaspora causes them to invest more in human capital relative to physical capital because the former is more portable and transferable. In a recent paper, Becker and Woessmann (2009) attributes the Protestants' higher literacy rate relative to Catholics in Germany to Luther's exhortation to read the bible. Therefore, especially relevant to this paper is the Islamic views on education.
Halstead (1995, 2004) The second stream, meanwhile, examines factors that are closely related to wealth and parental education attainment. Given that in general higher educated parents are wealthier, they are likely to allocate more household resources to education and are able to wait longer before recouping their investment in their children. In cases where they are constrained, it is easier for them to access the credit market. Moreover, it is possible that upbringing and home conditions in highly educated households are more conducive for education than the conditions experienced by a child whose parents are less educated.
In her theoretical contribution, Nordblom (2003) argues that holding everything else constant, children whose parents have a high ability will always have a higher educational attainment compared to ones whose parents have a low ability. Meanwhile, Cameron and Heckman (2001) use data from the United States and find that equalising one endowment, scholastic ability, between black, Hispanic, and white individuals overturns the lower college enrolment rate of blacks and Hispanics compared to whites. In Turkey, Kırdar (2009) finds that equalising household characteristics completely remove the enrolment gap experienced by Kurdish and Arabic boys relative to Turkish boys. Therefore, studies finding support for this stream put forward policy recommendations that include improving the scholastic ability of the children in the group that has the lower education outcome and removing credit constraints faced by the households that the children live in.
IV. Data
In this paper, I use the Indonesian Family Life Survey ( years of age, the labour force age threshold that is used in Indonesia.
The fact that Indonesia has a long-spanning longitudinal household survey is a key advantage compared to most other developing countries. It allows tracking of an individual who was still in primary school in 1993 up to 2007, when he or she is already well into adulthood. Thus, I face no difficulties with censored data and with individuals who dropped out of school and reenrolled later. The latter point is especially important in developing countries. Pradhan (1998) investigates the determinants of enrolment and delayed enrolment in Indonesia and finds that delayed enrolment make up between 13% and 33% of total enrolment at various grades in the secondary level. For this reason, it is crucial for a study that investigates school progression to have a dataset whose sample is already well beyond the official schooling ages.
Moreover, the fact that the first three rounds of IFLS were conducted within three-year intervals is coincident with the secondary education system in Indonesia, whose two levels are each three years long. Therefore, I could focus on the cohort that were in primary school in 1993, had to decide whether to continue to junior secondary school around 1997, and had to make a similar decision of whether to progress to senior secondary school around 2000. This enables me to investigate the influence of time-varying household conditions at around the time parents must make schooling decisions for their children. This is crucial as a child's background could have different effects at different education levels. As an example, family income would not play a very large role in equalising demand for education at the primary level in countries where such level is completely free, but could play a large role for higher levels where students are charged the full fee. Moreover, one must differentiate the effect of a permanent measure of household condition, such as parental education, from contemporaneous household conditions that would affect the decision to continue schooling at the time the decision must be made, such as family income. The
Indonesian dataset enables me to evaluate the role of each factor at different junctures in a child's education progression and separate a household's permanent condition from its time-varying conditions. While I would be able to very precisely measure the effects-ideally one needs an annual longitudinal survey-it is a step beyond most the studies in the literature.
The final advantage of IFLS is that it records a wealth of information on a person's experience and performance at school. It has data on the type of school the person attended, number of grade repetitions, the year he or she graduates from a particular school level, work activities during school, and the person's score in the national examinations at the end of each school level.
In this paper, I use the score in the primary level national examination as an indicator of a person's scholastic ability. The main reason for choosing this particular test is because of its comparability across regions, given that it was designed by the central government. The second reason is because the test measures an individual's proficiency in four subjects: mathematics, language, social sciences, and natural sciences.
I construct the sample the following way. I limit the sample to individuals who were between third and sixth grades in 1993 in order to circumvent cohort effects. Then I limit the sample to those who actually graduated from primary school. There are two reasons for this. Firstly, primary school graduation is nearly universal in Indonesia and the focus of this paper is on progression through secondary education. Secondly, I need the data on scholastic ability, which is only 
V. School Progression Rates and the Religion Progression Gap
In this section, I investigate the existence of religion gap in Indonesia. I examine an individual's school progression at five education stages: enrolment in junior secondary; graduation from junior secondary; enrolment in senior secondary; graduation from senior secondary; and enrolment in post-secondary. Following Sawada and Lokshin (2009) , Figure 3 provides the progression rates and cumulative attainment rates at different education stages. The progression rates are calculated as follows. Let S t-1 be the set of individuals who successfully finish education stage t-1. A subset of these individuals, S t , progress to the next education stage, namely t.
Therefore, the progression rate at stage t is S t /S t-1 . As an example, if S 1 individuals finish from primary school and S 2 individuals enrol in junior secondary school, the junior secondary school enrolment progression rate is S 2 /S 1 . The cumulative attainment rates, meanwhile, is the share of individuals in the sample that attains a level of education. graduate from that level. Looking across the education stages, it appears that once a person enrols at a level, he or she is almost guaranteed to finish that level. Hence, most of the dropouts occur at the transition between education levels. At the highest stage, only one-third of senior secondary graduates enrol in post-secondary education. Figure 4 shows the religion gaps in the progression rates at each education stage. It is important to note that the data do not show any religion gap with respect to graduation from primary school. Looking at males, I find that Muslim males have significantly lower progression rates at the senior secondary enrolment stage, of around 16.2 percentage points, and a 24.2-percentage point lower chance of enrolling in post-secondary. In addition to being much larger in absolute terms at post-secondary enrolment, the relative terms are even much higher given that mean progression rates are also much lower at the post-secondary enrolment level. Finally, a
Muslim male who manages to enrol in a senior secondary has a 6.1-percentage point lower probability of graduating from senior secondary schools.
Meanwhile, Figure 4 also shows that Muslim females encounter a 15.4-point lower chance of enrolling in junior secondary schools, where the gap is statistically different from zero.
However, there is no statistically significant religion gap with regards to other education stages, although the gap at post-secondary enrolment is substantial relative to enrolment rate at this level.
Hence, there appears to be gender-specific traits in the religion gap. Among males, the significant religion gap occurs at the last three education stages, while it only occurs at senior secondary enrolment among females.
In addition to looking at a snapshot of current state of religion gap in education progression, it is also useful to see its dynamics over time in order to determine whether the pattern has changed or has remained constant. later, it appears that religion inequality in senior secondary qualification has decreased, while the religion gap in tertiary qualified individuals has magnified. Therefore, while the focus in 1993 was that the majority of Muslim children not continuing to junior secondary school, the issue has shifted to the fact that less Muslim children were continuing to senior secondary school. 
VI. Explaining the Religion Education Progression Gap
After ascertaining in the previous section that Muslims face lower education progression rates compared to non-Muslims, in this section I investigate the reasons behind them. Considering the evidence thus far, one important exercise would be to separate long-term and short-term explanations. Cameron and Heckman (2001) argues that long-term family investment is more important than relieving short-term credit constraints in addressing ethnic gap. Meanwhile, the literature is scant in developing countries. In Turkey, Kırdar (2009) finds that equalising household characteristics completely remove the enrolment gap experienced by Kurdish and Arabic boys relative to Turkish boys. However, he does not distinguish between the effect of equalising longterm household conditions and the effect of equalising short-term ones. Given that the policy implications are vastly different-the former calls for long-term human capital investment and the latter calls for cash transfers or school scholarships-it is unclear which policy to undertake in order to reduce the enrolment ethnic gap in Turkey. Looking at the evidence from India, however, it is unlikely that merely providing cash transfers would be sufficient (Borooah and Iyer, 2005) .
In this paper, I separate the permanent and contemporaneous portions of household background. The former includes parental education and, following Borjas (1992) , the religion capital at the parents' generation. For the latter, I use the conditions of a household at three different occasions in the first three waves of IFLS. In addition to household background variables, I include a set of covariates on access to schools in 1993. I do not include any measures of school access in 1997 and 2000 because they are highly correlated to the 1993 conditions. Finally, I
include a set of variables that record various infrastructure conditions in the district. Appendix 1 shows the means of these variables at the various education stages.
Before providing the effect of equalising endowments on the religion gap, Table 3 shows the average differences between Muslims and non-Muslims with regards to these endowments. Among males, it appears that Muslim children on average score around 0.4 standard deviations lower than non-Muslim children. The mean ability gap between Muslim and non-Muslim females, meanwhile, is much smaller and statistically insignificant. Hence, ability may prove to be an important cause of the observed religion gap among males, but not among females.
In the United States, Hill and O'Neill (1994) find that family background plays an important influence in explaining the test score differentials between blacks, Hispanics, and whites. Looking at the difference in parental education level between Muslims and non-Muslims, it appears that there are not much gender differences. Both Muslim males and females have fathers who are much less educated than non-Muslim males and females respectively. On average, the chance of a Muslim child to have a father with at least nine years of education is between 55.0 and 61.3 percentage points lower than a non-Muslim child. There are, however, significant differences in the religion gap between males and females with regards to maternal education. The average probability that the mother of a Muslim male has at least a junior secondary credential is 63.9
percentage points lower than a non-Muslim male. Among females, meanwhile, the gap is about 27.5 percentage points. Comparing the wealth gap between religions in the three IFLS waves, meanwhile, shows that Muslim and non-Muslim households have relatively the same amount of wealth. In sum, it appears that Muslim children are born into families with lower education levels but are not more credit-constrained than non-Muslim children. In the rest of this section, I investigate the effects of equalising these differences on the religion gap in education progression. Merely looking at these results, one could expect equalising parental education and scholastic ability to have an important role in explaining religion gap, while household wealth could be expected to have little or not effect.
The reduced form probit model that I estimate is in Equation 1.
where the probability of person i living in household j in community k to achieve education stage t conditional on finishing education stage t-1 depends on his or her religious affiliation, where M i is equal to one if he or she is a Muslim and zero otherwise, the individual's scholastic ability A, a vector of household characteristics X, and community characteristics C. The main coefficient of interest is !, the gap in education attainment of Muslims and non-Muslims, specifically how its size and statistical significance change as I equalise differences in other background characteristics.
Without controlling for other covariates except age, the estimated size of ! is already shown in Figure 3 in the previous section. Finally, since there is no significant religion gap in the first two education stages, I only show the estimation results for the final three education stages.
I begin with religion gap among males as shown in At senior secondary graduation, meanwhile, controlling for scholastic ability does not change the gap, but controlling for parental education removes the entire gap. Moving on to the highest education stage, there is a substantial religion gap at post-secondary enrolment. While equalising scholastic ability and parental education reduces the gap from 24.2 percentage points to 13.4 percentage points, it remains substantial despite being insignificant. Controlling for additional covariates does not significantly reduce the size of the gap; instead it prononunced the gap to as high as 17.7 percentage points before decreasing to 11.3 percentage points once I include all the covariates. At this stage, although the gap remains substantial relative to the mean progression rate, it is quite imprecisely estimated. 8 Given that I am already controlling for factors that may influence demand and supply of education, one plausible explanation may lie in differences in labour market returns.
9 Muslim males may choose to not enrol in tertiary education if the wage premium from such qualification is relatively low compared to the cost. However, this explanation would be valid if it is also the case that the returns to tertiary qualification among Muslim males are lower compared to non-Muslim males. For this purpose, I use data of all adults from the IFLS and investigate the tertiary qualification premium in the labour market enjoyed by Muslim and non-Muslim males.
The estimation results are in Table 5 . I examine five labour market outcomes among males with at least a senior secondary qualification: labour force participation, employment conditional on labour force participation, job type, occupation sector, and hourly wage. The coefficient in each column shows the tertiary qualification premium relative to senior secondary qualification for Muslim and non-Muslim males in each labour market outcome. The point is to compare the premium that a Muslim male faces relative to a similarly qualified non-Muslim male.
There does not seem to be any difference in tertiary premium faced by Muslim and nonMuslim males with regards to labour force participation and unemployment rate. Tertiary educated individuals from both groups face similarly lower labour force participation rate compared to senior secondary educated individuals. With regards to employment, meanwhile, a tertiary educated Muslim male does not have a higher employment rate compared to a Muslim male who only has a senior secondary qualification. For non-Muslims, meanwhile, the tertiary premium is around 7.7-percentage point higher employment rate. Looking at job types, both tertiary educated 8 The gap is significant at the 10% confidence level. 9 Another explanation pertains to unobserved condition of the neighbourhood, which could be tied to peer effects (Haveman and Wolfe, 1995) or school quality (Hanushek, Lavy, and Hitomi, 2008) . I do not have such information in the dataset. Conceptually, I could include district dummies to take these into account. Even if it works, however, I still would not be able to precisely pinpoint the cause of the gap. Hence, I decide to not go down this avenue further.
Muslim and non-Muslim males do not appear to be working in different jobs than their senior secondary educated counterparts.
The next labour market outcome that I examine is occupation sector. Among Muslim males, it appears that a tertiary qualification enables them to work in the services sector compared to those with only senior secondary qualification. For non-Muslim males, meanwhile, there is no statistically significant difference in the sector of occupation of tertiary educated individuals compared to those with a senior secondary qualification. The final labour market outcome is wages. Table 5 shows that the tertiary wage premium enjoyed by Muslim males is 50.2%, while it is 128.5% among non-Muslim males. The difference in the wage premium is statistically significant, and is possibly the strongest explanation of why more non-Muslim males continue to tertiary education compared to Muslim males. Although interesting, I leave investigating the reasons behind this widely different tertiary wage premium for the future. For the purposes of this paper, it serves as a strong explanation of the persistent religion gap in tertiary education enrolment among males.
After investigating the reasons behind the religion gap in education progression among males, I turn the investigation to females. Table 6 provides the stepwise results of the effects of controlling for each group of covariates on the observed religion gap. Starting from senior secondary enrolment, it appears that equalising scholastic ability slightly reduces the religion gap from 15.4 to 12.5 percentage points. Controlling for parental and religion capital further decreases the gap to 6.6 percentage points and removes its statistical significance. While there are no statistically significant religion gaps among females at the two top education stages, it is interesting to note that for the gap at post secondary enrolment, equalising scholastic ability and parental education reduces the magnitude of the gap from 12.4 percentage points to 1.5 percentage points.
To conclude, the results in this section strongly suggest that the substantial religion gap between Muslims and non-Muslims could be narrowed by equalising scholastic ability and parental education. After controlling for these two factors, household wealth and other household conditions do not seem to play any additional role in bridging the rest of the gap, which in most cases already cease to be statistically significant. The same is also true for the variables that measure access to education. In cases where the gap is persistent, it appears that it is driven by lower labour market outcomes. The finding corroborates that of Cameron and Heckman (2001) in the United States, where the ethnic gap in education is not persistent in the majority of cases. Moreover, comparing long-term and short-term factors, it appears that the long-term influence of household characteristics, measured by parental education and scholastic ability, have the greater influence in a child's attainments than shortterm household wealth. Therefore, while providing short-term relieve from budgetary constraints may be helpful in keeping children in school in extraordinary circumstances (Sparrow, 2007) , such policies may not be sufficient to address religion gap in education progression in Indonesia.
VII. Gender Gap in Education Progression
Female school participation is especially important since mothers traditionally play a larger role than fathers in educating children (Behrman et al., 1999) . 10 It is unclear whether different religious doctrines contribute to the observed gender gaps in developing countries. EdStats show that female net enrolment rates in Pakistan, a Muslim majority country, are lower compared to males. 11 At the primary level, the gap is 16.0 percentage points, while it is seven percentage points at the secondary level in
2006. In India, the female school enrolment rate among 6-14 year-old Muslim children is nine percentage points lower compared to the males (Borooah and Iyer, 2005) . In contrast, Hajj and Panizza (2009) find that other things equal, both Lebanese Muslim and Christian females tend to 10 This is not always the case. Behrman and Rosenzweig (2002) and Plug (2004) use data from the United States and find that a mother's education does not have a larger effect on children's attainment compared to the father's education.
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EdStats is an online education database maintained by the World Bank. Its URL is http://www.worldbank.org/educaton/edstats. The significant gender education gap in Pakistan is a topic that has received much attention, for example in Aslam (2009). receive more education than their respective male counterparts. In the case of Indonesia, Alderman and King (1998) state that along with Malaysia, the two countries' absence of pronounced gender gap serves as a rebuttal against the view that Islam may have a role in explaining lower female education attainment in developing countries. Figure 5 shows the gender gap in education progression among Muslims and non-Muslims.
Among Muslims, I find that Indonesian females do not face a significantly lower chance to in progressing through secondary education compared to male Muslims. Interestingly, the only statistically significant and substantial gap occurs at post secondary enrolment, where females have an 11.9-percentage point higher chance of enrolling compared to males. These results corroborate the argument put forward by Alderman and King (1998) . Taking the suggestion by Hoodfar (2007) into account, it is possible that the version of Islam observed in Indonesia is the more egalitarian one. This is also supported by the fact that Indonesian Muslims are much more moderate compared to other Muslim-majority countries.
12 Looking at non-Muslims, meanwhile, there is no statistically significant gap with regards to education progression.
However, similar to the case in the previous section, it is important to investigate whether the apparent lack of female lag in education in Indonesia is caused by endowment differences. To examine the gender progression gap among Muslims more closely, Table 7 examines whether equalising differences change the size and statistical significance of the observed gap.
The results show that once the higher ability of Muslim females is taken into account, a statistically significant and substantial gender gap of seven percentage points emerges at senior secondary enrolment. While controlling for parental education and household condition appear to moderate the gap, indicating that the gap does not originate from within the household, it widens to 7.2 percentage points once I equalise schooling experience. Thus, it appears that one main reason that the gap at senior secondary enrolment is small is because female Muslims have higher test scores and more favourable schooling experience. At post secondary enrolment, the gender gap narrows to half of its original size with the inclusion of all the covariates and is not statistically significant. It appears that the three largest sets of covariates that contribute to the largest decline in the higher female enrolment rate are scholastic ability, parental education, and schooling experience. This is a similar pattern to the results at senior secondary enrolment, where controlling for scholastic ability and schooling experience affects the post-secondary enrolment pattern of males favourably while controlling for parental education favours gender parity.
In summary, the table provides an explanation with regards to the reputation that Indonesia enjoys compared to other Muslim-majority countries, in that there does not appear to be any gender gaps in education in Indonesia (Alderman and King, 1998) . Indeed, the raw female gap shown in Table 7 shows that Muslim females have at least the same chance of progressing through the education system as Muslim males. However, I find that equalising gender differences in scholastic ability and schooling experience unearths a statistically significant and substantial female lag at senior secondary enrolment and significantly narrows the higher female enrolment rate at post-secondary enrolment. Moreover, since there is persistent gender parity in education among non-Muslims, I also could not rule out that Islam as a religion could play a role in the discrimination.
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VIII. Robustness checks a. Migration
It is plausible that individuals move away from their homes to attend higher education. Not controlling for this could introduce an omitted variables bias in the enrolment estimations if the decision to move is correlated with household wealth, parental education, or the individual's access to schools. One advantage of using a longitudinal dataset is that I have information on which individuals move between waves. Table 8 In order to further see the effect of migration, I include movement status as another independent variable in the estimations. The results are shown in Table 9 . In general, the findings in the previous section seem robust to inclusion of the movement variables. -0.066 0.061 Notes: ** significant at 5%, *** significant at 1%; figures are average marginal effects; # indicates that there is no variance within the religion or gender groups with regards to the dependent variable.
b. Muslims versus Christians
The second largest religious group in Indonesia is Christianity. Together with Islam, the two religions make up 95% of the Indonesian population.
14 Hence, it is interesting to see whether the religion gap that I observe in the previous section is actually a Muslim-Christian gap or whether the two groups actually have the same education progression rates but lag behind other religion.
The estimation results are in Table 10 . Comparing the religion gap among females in Table 10 with Table 6 , it appears that while the gap at senior secondary enrolment has a larger magnitude, equalising scholastic ability and parental education removes the Christian advantage. Moreover, the size of the gap after controlling for community condition is 4.8 percentage points. Finally, at postsecondary enrolment, there is an 18.9-percentage point Christian advantage over Muslims, which is only significant at the 10% level. While this is larger than the gap observed in Table 6 , controlling for scholastic ability reduces the gap to 13.4 percentage points, and equalising differences in parental education completely eliminates the gap. Comparing the results for males by looking at Columns 3 and 4 of Table 10 and Table 4 , it seems that the gaps in senior secondary and post secondary enrolment behave the same way. Hence, it appears that among males, the observed gap in Table 4 is mostly a Christian-Muslim gap. In summary, the results in Table 10 show that focusing the sample to Christians and Muslims does not significantly alter the results shown in Section VI. Hence, the conclusions in the previous section hold. Namely, there are religion gaps in education progression in Indonesia and that equalising scholastic ability and parental education substantially reduces the size of the gap.
c. Excluding Ability
It is widely accepted that parental education is one of the strongest inputs to a person's scholastic ability.
15 Given that I find these two sets of covariates, scholastic ability and parental education, to be the strongest reasons for the observed religion gap in education, it would be interesting to see whether excluding scholastic ability would change the conclusion. The results are shown in Table 11 . In general, it appears that I would have come to the conclusion of parental education to be the single most important explanation for the results in the previous two sections.
However, having data on scholastic ability would result in reducing the religion gap among males at post-secondary enrolment to about 11.3 percentage points and removes it statistical significance. Therefore, although not having data on scholastic ability would not change the conclusion regarding the importance of parental education, without the information I would not be able to ascertain ability difference to be one of two main reasons for male non-Muslim to have a higher post-secondary enrolment rate. 
IX. Religion Gap in Unconditional Schooling Attainment
The results in Section V uncover a disadvantage faced by Muslim children with regards to school progression conditional on entry to a schooling level or graduation from the previous schooling level. In this section, I examine religion gap in unconditional schooling attainment. In a sense, this is looking at a different issue, where the focus of investigation shifts to a broader scope; namely, whether there is a gap in the probability of a child to acquire a certain education qualification. In this section, I
focus on the probability of a child to get a senior secondary qualification.
The estimation results are shown in Table 12 . Column 1 shows that Muslim males have a 26-percentage point lower chance of completing senior secondary compared to non-Muslim males. It appears that this gap is only partly caused by differences in ability, as equalising scholastic ability only slightly reduces the gap to 22.2 percentage points. However, controlling for parental education significantly narrows the gap to 5.3 percentage points, where it is now statistically insignificant.
Finally, controlling for all the covariates leaves the gap at 2.5 percentage points.
Looking at the chance of enrolling in post-secondary education, meanwhile, Column 2 shows that the substantial gap can be reduced to 8.5 percentage points after equalising scholastic ability and parental education. However, controlling for household condition and schooling experience results in pronouncing the gap, implying that credit constraints may be binding at this education stage. The final religion gap stands at 9.4 percentage points. Moving to female Muslim disadvantage as shown in Columns 3 and 4, the observed disadvantage of 13.9 percentage points is much smaller than that among males and is statistically insignificant. At post-secondary enrolment, meanwhile, once again equalising scholastic ability and parental education removes the wide progression gap.
Finally, with regards to gender gap among Muslims shown in Columns 5 and 6, the results show that gender parity in the probability to acquire a senior secondary diploma is likely to be driven by differences in schooling experience. Once I equalise this set of covariates, females have lower senior secondary completion rate and the gender's higher post-secondary enrolment disappears. In summary, the results I find in the previous sections are robust to using different education outcome indicators.
X. Determinants of Scholastic Ability
The findings above point to the importance of scholastic ability in removing education progression gap between Muslims and non-Muslims, most notably among males. Indeed, as Table 3 shows, Muslim males score 0.45 standard deviations lower in the test. Therefore, it is important to explore what factors influence a person's ability. Given that the test is usually taken when an individual is 12 years old, the main explanatory variables that I focus on are factors that are plausibly exogenous. These include parental education and household characteristics in the earliest period of the survey. Since I have no good data on school quality, I include district fixed effects in the last specification. Table 13 shows the estimation results. Column 3 shows that factors that are positively correlated with ability among males are father's education and household wealth as proxied by expenditure data. However, the column also shows that the unexplained Muslim gap is still substantial at 0.31 standard deviations. In Column 6, meanwhile, it appears that the important factor for female ability is mother's education. The effect is substantial at higher education levels; daughters whose mother are college educated perform 0.9 higher standard deviations compared to daughters whose mothers have primary schooling education or below. Moreover, the Muslim gap in scholastic ability is not statistically different from zero.
In summary, this section shows that parental education plays a large role in a child's scholastic ability. Together with the results in the previous section, I find that parental education is the most influential factor in explaining religion gap in education. After controlling for parental education, however, the results in this paper also show that scholastic ability also has an independent and substantial effect in explaining the Muslim and non-Muslim gap. 502 Notes: ** 5% significance, *** 1% significance; robust standard errors clustered at household level in parentheses; dependent variable is year-adjusted standardised score in primary school exit examination; estimation has a control for missing parental education; the excluded category in parental education is not completing primary.
XI. Conclusion
This paper investigates the extent of Muslim and non-Muslim gap in education progression using a longitudinal dataset from Indonesia. Among males, a Muslim faces a significantly lower chance of enrolling at the senior secondary and tertiary levels, with the gap widest at post-secondary enrolment. Among females, meanwhile, Muslim gap is only found at senior secondary enrolment. In addition, this paper examines gender gap within each religious group. I find that the only significant gap takes place among Muslims at post-secondary enrolment, in which females have a higher progression rate than males. In contrast, there is no gender gap among non-Muslims. I find that controlling for two main sets of covariates-scholastic ability and parental education-removes a large share and the statistical significance of the gap. In contrast, equalising household characteristics, including per capita expenditures, and access to schools largely has no effect on narrowing the religion gap. Examining the specification without scholastic ability, however, it appears that parental education plays a larger role in education progression than scholastic ability.
There is an exception to the finding above. Muslim males face much lower probability of enrolling in tertiary education. While the gap is only imprecisely measured after I equalise every factor that could potentially cause the gap, it remains large. It appears the main cause of this gap is the lower wage returns of further education beyond the secondary level faced by Muslims compared to non-Muslims.
The final note pertains to the gender gap among Muslims. I find that the main reason for the fact that females have at least the same chance of progressing through school is because they are more able, which in turn provides them with more favourable schooling experience. Once I equalise these differences, females face much lower chance to enroll in the senior secondary level and there is a sizable reduction in the gap at post-secondary enrolment. This is not the case among non-Muslims, where the gender parity is robust. Therefore, I cannot rule out the possible contribution of Islamic teaching for this phenomenon.
With the findings in this paper, it appears long-term investments in human capital is more important than providing short term-relieve for credit constraints in ensuring that the children in a household progresses through secondary level education in developing countries. This does not mean that short-term credit constraints should not be addressed, as there is evidence that it may be binding for Muslim males at post-secondary enrolment. The government should still provide school scholarships to the poor, especially in extraordinary economic conditions. However, such policies may not be able to remove the observed religion gap in education progression. 
